Group status, minorities and trust by Tsutsui, Kei & Zizzo, Daniel
CBESS Discussion Paper 10-10 
 
 
 
 
 
Group Status, Minorities and 
Trust 
 
by Kei Tsutsui* and Daniel John Zizzo* 
 
* CBESS and School of Economics, University of East 
Anglia, Norwich NR4 7TJ, UK. 
Email: kei.tsutsui@uea.ac.uk; d.zizzo@uea.ac.uk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
We present the results of an experiment that attempts to measure 
the impact of majority and minority groups, and high status and low 
status groups, on well-being, cooperation and social capital. In the 
experiment, group membership is induced artificially, subjects 
interact with insiders and outsiders in trust games and periodically 
enter markets where they can trade group membership. We find that 
trust falls with groups because of discrimination against outsiders. 
Against this, however, there is evidence that low group status and 
minority subjects are less satisfied, and that low status subjects trust 
less other low status subjects. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years economists have paid an increasing attention to the importance of 
groups in understanding and explaining social capital, cooperation and conflict. For example, 
there is some evidence from experimental economics that membership in a group matters for 
individuals in the sense that it can affect their behavior in prisoner’s dilemma and battle of 
the sexes games (Gary Charness et al., 2007; Lorenz Goette et al., 2006), in the public goods 
game (e.g., Jonathan H. W. Tan and Friedel Bolle, 2007), in bargaining settings (Shaun P. 
Hargreaves-Heap and Yanis Varoufakis, 2002; Daniel J. Zizzo, 2003), two person sequential 
games (Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li, 2009), trust games (Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and 
Daniel J. Zizzo, 2009) and in coordination games (Roy Chen and Yan Chen, 2010). 
Intergroup bias forms naturally already with children (e.g., Muzafer Sherif, 1967; James Sean 
Files et al., 2010) and group identification has been hypothesized to be a source of individual 
well-being (e.g., George A. Akerlof and Rachel E. Kranton, 2000); indeed, there is some 
neurobiological evidence that being a member of a group produces an endorphin rush (see 
Robin Dunbar, 2006). 
The starting point of this paper is that groups come in different relative sizes and 
statuses. When there is discussion of ethnic conflict, for example, this is often phrased along 
the lines of majorities and minorities.1 Similarly, perceptions of different social status are 
often perceived to accompany members of different groups:2 for example, within an 
organization, members of a given team or of an ‘old boys and/or girls network’ being given 
status that other teams or those who are not in the elite network within the same organization 
do not have; or, more generally, Ivy League graduates vs. graduates from a local community 
college; or members of different castes in the traditional Hindu societal structure (BBC, 
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 For example, Hutu majority and Tutsi minority in Burundi and Rwanda; Sinhalese majority and Tamil 
minority in Sri Lanka; the French majority and Roma minority in France; the national ethnic majority and the 
Jewish minority at various times of European history, such as 16th century Spain or Nazi Germany; the black 
majority and white minority in South Africa at the time of apartheid.   
2
 Psychological theories that have tried to explain hierarchical group relationships are social identity theory 
(Henri Tajfel and John Turner, 2001), where lower status groups contribute less to individual social identity 
therefore leading to differential attitudes; more directly, social dominance theory (Jim Sidanius and Felicia  
Pratto, 1999), which posits that low status group exhibit less ingroup bias insofar as they see the status 
differential as legitimate; and system justification theory (John T. Jost and Mahzarin R. Banaji, 1994), in which 
low status subjects are seen as internalizing beliefs that serve to maintain the status quo, even when detrimental 
to themselves. 
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2007). In some cases majority and minority status coincide with high and low status 
respectively: for example, domestic nationals versus perceived foreigners that are deemed of 
low status (e.g., Kimberly Costello and Gordon Hodson, 2010). Recent policy measures in 
both western Europe and United States have come under scrutiny for the extent to which they 
may hide, or institutionalize, intergroup discrimination.3 In Japan, the segregation between 
the ordinary citizens who belonged to four recognized ranks (samurai warriors; farmers; 
artisans and trade people) and the minority outsiders were institutionalized in the sixteenth 
century. The discrimination against the outcast group still exists nowadays (Yoshio 
Sugimoto, 2003). However, a connection between social status and majority/minority status 
is not always present: for example, while the Finnish minority in Sweden is seen as low 
status, the Swedish community in Finland is seen as high status (Karmela Liebkind et al., 
2008). 
A key step in trying to understand the implications of groups for economies and 
organizations is then to look at how changing relative group size and/or changing group 
status affects preferences and behavior. The novelty of this paper is in making a first step 
towards understanding the impact of relative group size and status effects on the perceived 
incentivized valuation of groups and on corresponding incentivized behavior. We do so by 
running an experiment in the context of trust games, which is a natural stylized modeling 
setup for the operation of social capital. For example, in an organizational context, and as 
noted by Noel D. Johnson and Alexandra Mislin (2008), trust is recognized to raise efficiency 
by lower monitoring costs and turnover and by increasing uncompensated positive behavior 
from employees. Exchanges between group members are usually thought to incur smaller 
transaction costs (i.e., waste fewer resources) than would otherwise be the case (see, e.g., 
Francis Fukuyama, 1995, Economic Journal, 2002). These are normally seen as working in 
the direction of what Shaun P. Hargreaves Heap and Daniel J. Zizzo (2009; HHZ in what 
follows) label positive discrimination: i.e. greater trust and trustworthiness than what would 
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 Three recent examples are the new controversial anti-immigration policy in Arizona, which is being legally 
challenged by the Obama administration (CBS News, 2010); the recent waves of anti-Roma raids in France 
(Ethel Brooks, 2010); and the curious way in which the U.K. the increase in high fee paying international 
student numbers is seen as a problem requiring a tightening in immigration policy (Helene Mulholland, 2010), 
at a time in which heavy public funding cuts should imply a greater rather than lower need for the income that 
these students bring.  
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be expected if there were no partitions of agents into groups.4 Cooperation, as expressed in 
trust and trustworthiness, could however also work in the direction of what HHZ label 
negative discrimination: i.e. lower trust and trustworthiness than what would be expected if 
there were no partitions of agents into groups. HHZ found evidence of negative 
discrimination in their trust game experiment, which suggests that the relationship between 
groups and social capital may be more complex than it is usually posited, at least in a trust 
game setup.5 
In what is a first step towards analyzing relative group size and status effects, our focus 
is on a simple, incentivized, behavioral experiment that implements our experimental 
treatment manipulations in a minimal way. We stress the word ‘incentivized’ because, 
although there is work in experimental psychology looking at relative group size and status 
effects, the focus is typically (a) on attitudes rather than behavior (e.g., Naomi Ellemers et al., 
1992; John T. Jost and Diana Burgess, 2000; Markus Lücken and Bernd Simon, 2005; 
Alberto Voci, 2006); (b) when behavior is involved, deception is systematically used in 
invoking the connection between responses and behavior (e.g., Itesh Sachdev and Richard Y. 
Bourhis, 1985, 1991); (c) deception is more generally and systematically employed in 
treatment manipulations and elsewhere in the experimental design (e.g., all the studies listed 
under parts a and b). This is not to say that this psychological research is not useful: it clearly 
is, and we shall relate and compare our findings with those from the psychological research in 
the discussion section; but it also shows that it can only be used as a starting point. For 
example, Edward L. Glaeser et al. (2000) found that the reported answers to survey questions 
on trust were often not associated with how subjects actually trusted one another in an 
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 One can always label the set of all subjects as a group, and so in a sense one could rephrase this as stating that 
the introduction of further sub-groups would lead to further trust and trustworthiness within the sub-group 
relative to the baseline in which no sub-group would exist. The same would be true in an experimental setting, 
i.e. all subjects in an experimental group could identify themselves as a single group in addition to any further 
group manipulation; but this does not prevent us from identifying experimentally the effects of having a further 
group manipulation, and this is what HHZ already do. As a result, we find it simpler to rely just on the standard 
terminology of talking of either partitioning subjects into groups or not having groups; and we follow others 
(such as Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li, 2009; Roy Chen and Yan Chen, 2010 and HHZ) in doing so. 
5
 Table 2 of Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li (2009) shows evidence of positive discrimination but, arguably, 
stronger evidence of negative discrimination in their sequential bargaining games. The findings on negative 
discrimination stand in contrast with the emphasis by some on positive discrimination (e.g., Marilynn B. 
Brewer, 1999).  
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experimental trust game; and there is no behavioral research referring specifically to 
majority/minority and social status relationships in trust settings.6 
Experiments with natural groups are less likely to employ deception (e.g., Christopher 
L. Abelson and Lauren M. Howanski’s, 2002, attitudinal study), but, once natural groups as 
opposed to artificial groups are introduced, the question arises of disentangling what we 
might label as the ‘pure’ effect of group membership and intergroup relations from what may 
be, and often plausibly are, expectations and stereotyping effects at play (e.g., Jasmina 
Arifovic et al., 2010; Karmela Liebkind, Anna Henning-Lindblom and Erling Solheim, 
2008). This is what makes employing artificial groups desirable in a first step to identify 
relative size and status effects. This approach has a further advantage. Once the ‘pure’ effects 
of group membership have been identified, they can be used in the future to disentangle the 
two types of influence in natural groups. In other words, our results form a potential baseline 
for future studies that attempt to identify the particular contribution that comes from an actual 
group’s constitutive norms. 
Our experimental design benchmark is HHZ. To identify relative group size effects, all 
we do, relative to the random color group assignment treatment of HHZ, is to vary the group 
size from the two HHZ groups of 6 subjects each to having one group of 8 subjects and one 
group of 4 subjects.7 We control for absolute group size effects by also having control 
treatments in which we either pair two groups of 4 subjects each or we pair two groups of 8 
subjects each.8  To identify status effects, all we do is to change the labeling frame we adopt 
in experimental sessions: rather than talking of a Blue group and a Red group (as we do in the 
other treatments, finding symmetrical results as HHZ do), we phrase the instructions in terms 
of a Blue group and in terms of subjects who are “not belonging to any group” or “outsiders 
to the group”. This is a minimal status group manipulation: that of being in a first group and 
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 Alberto Voci (2006) considers trust attitudes towards insiders and outsiders in a questionnaire study involving 
northern and southern Italians. He finds that trust attitudes mediate questionnaire evaluations of ingroup and 
outgroup members.  
7
 We rely on random matching to prevent the problem of differential frequencies of interactions with insiders or 
outsiders, leading to potential differential repeated game effects. More details on this are in section 3.  
8
 Larger majorities and smaller minorities are of course of interest for future research, but they are not suitable 
for a first study since, because of the random matching mechanism needed as per the previous footnote, it would 
reduce considerably the amount of data from insider – outsider interaction, and the likelihood to have the power 
to detect intergroup discrimination in the lab. 
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that of being in a second group which is defined purely negatively by not being a member of 
the first group. Such a minimal status group manipulation arguably has the advantage of 
improving the interpretability of the results relative to stronger manipulations based on 
entitlements inducing quizzes and/or a public ceremony at the end of the experiment (e.g., 
Sheryl Ball et al., 2001). Deservingness perceptions – as induced by quizzes - is an 
alternative obvious source of differential behavior (e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman and Matthew L.  
Spitzer, 1985, James Konow, 2000), and public ceremonies arguably increase the likelihood 
of experimenter demand effects driving the results.9 The subtlety of our cue helps reduce the 
likelihood of experimenter demand effects; we use a variant of a Charles A. Holt and Susan 
K. Laury (2002) task as an extra control for whether such effects drive our results, and we 
find that they do not.10 It also has external validity insofar as it mirrors the way in which 
sometimes low status is associated to being perceived as being outsiders to the high status 
groups, as the buraku are relative to the four recognized ranks of traditional Japanese society 
(Sugimoto, 2002). 
To give a preview of our other findings, intergroup (negative) discrimination is robust 
across majorities and minorities, though there is a distinct sense that majority subjects like 
being in the majority and, in general, subjects who value more their own group membership 
are also subjects who discriminate more. Minority subjects appeared to discriminate less and 
comparatively disliked being in the minority; while low status subjects comparatively 
disliked being low status and discriminated less by pulling other low status subjects down. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 present the experimental 
design and results, respectively. Section 4 discusses the results, while section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Experimental Design 
A. Outline and Stage 1 
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 Sheryl Ball et al. (2001) claim that experimenter demand effects do not drive their results; for the opposite 
view, see Daniel J. Zizzo (2010). 
10
 See Daniel J. Zizzo (2010) for a discussion of experimenter demand effects. Section 4 contains a further 
discussion of our status manipulation. 
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The experiment was conducted in January and February 2010 at our university.11 Apart 
from the experimental instructions and a control questionnaire, the experiment was fully 
computerized. The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Urs 
Fischbacher, 2007). Almost all subjects were university students, from a wide variety of 
subject backgrounds. A total of 312 subjects participated in the 26 sessions. Subjects were 
randomly seated in the laboratory. Computer terminals were partitioned to avoid 
communication by facial or verbal means. Subjects read the experimental instructions and 
answered a control questionnaire, to check understanding of the instructions, before 
proceeding with the tasks. They were advised individually if any answers in the 
questionnaires were incorrect. The experimental instructions had a neutral frame (e.g., did not 
refer to ‘trust’, ‘trusters’ or ‘trustees’) except for the context manipulations specified below. 
The experiment used ‘experimental points’ as currency, each worth 4 UK pence (0.04 
pounds). 
There were five experimental treatments, each with two groups per session: two groups 
frame of 8 subjects (88); two groups frame of 4 subjects (44); two groups frame, one with a 
majority of 8 subjects and the other with a minority of 4 subjects (84); one group frame, with 
the minority group of 4 being ‘the group’ (S8); one group frame, with the majority group of 4 
being ‘the group’ (S4). As baselines for the data analysis, we also rely on the no groups 
treatment (B) and the two groups of 6 subjects each with random matching also reported in 
HHZ (66).12  
At the start of the experiment subjects were randomly assigned to one of two groups,13 
to be made of either 4 or 8 subjects depending on the treatment, and this was common 
knowledge. In two groups frame treatments, the groups were labeled the Red group and the 
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 The experimental instructions are provided at http://www.uea.ac.uk/~ec601/MinExpEAppendix.pdf. 
12
  B had 5 sessions and 66 had 4 sessions, implying a total of an additional 9 x 12 = 108 subjects for the data 
analysis. 66 is labeled as C treatment in HHZ; we have changed the labelling to make it more congruent with 
that of our experimental treatments. Using two treatments from HHZ as baselines is especially useful as the 
subject samples were comparable, as (a) they were run in the same university and so with the same kind of 
subject pool and (b) the same experimenter (namely, the first author of this paper) materially conducted both our 
experimental sessions and those reported in HHZ. 
13
 A similar minimal group manipulation has been used for example by Shaun P. Hargreaves-Heap and Yanis 
Varoufakis (2002). 
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Blue group.14 In the one group frame treatments, there is a Blue group and there are four or 
eight subjects (depending on the treatment) who in the instructions are referred to as “not 
belonging to any group” or “outsiders to the group”. 
Our key experimental treatments are those that look at majorities and minorities: 84, S4 
and S8. 84 considers the effect of having a majority and a minority framed as providing two 
group identities of equal status except for the potential implications of being a majority group 
or a minority group. S4 and S8 consider the effect of differential status by having a single 
group labeled as such, as discussed in the introduction and further in section 4. In S4 the high 
status framed group is the minority; in S8 it is the majority and so the potential effects of 
being in the majority and being the framed group combine. 
Any difference in behavior from being in the majority or in the minority may however 
not be due to any majority-minority effect (whether or not combined with a 1 group frame 
effect) but rather to the absolute size of the group (4 or 8 subjects). In 44 and 88 there are no 
majorities and minorities, but by having groups of 4 (in 44) and of 8 (in 88) we are able to 
control for absolute group size effects. 44 and 88 do however change the absolute number of 
people participating to each experimental session (8 and 16, respectively, relative to the 12 of 
the other treatments), and to control for this as well we can employ the experimental data 
from 66 in HHZ. Finally, there is a question about what would happen if there were no 
groups, and the B treatment from HHZ provides such a useful baseline.15 
Each session was divided into four stages plus four additional behavioral tasks, and the 
overall experimental sequence and set of treatments is summarized in Table 1. 
(Insert Table 1 about here.)  
B. Stage 1 
Stage 1 had three rounds and was common to all treatments. Each round was a standard 
Joyce Berg et al. (1995) basic trust game. The truster (the ‘First Mover’) received 24 
experimental points and had to decide how many points (if any) to give to the other person 
and how many (if any) to keep. All the points given were multiplied by a conversion rate 
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 In treatment 84, three sessions were run with the Red group as the majority group and three with the Blue 
group as the majority group.  
15
 HHZ also test the effect of not having markets on trust game play, and find it has no significant effect.  
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equal to 3 before they were received by the trustee (the ‘Second Mover’). The trustee then 
decided how much (if any) to keep and how much (if any) to return to the truster. Subjects 
were matched randomly and anonymously each round.16 The only information they received 
was about their round co-player’s decision and about their own round earnings; in treatments 
with groups, they had no information about the color group of co-players. The key purpose of 
stage 1 was to provide subjects practice and experience with trust games.  
C. Stages 2 Through 4 
Trust games. In stages 2, 3 and 4 subjects played six trust games as in stage 1, but with 
the following differences. Each round trusters were allocated 48 points rather than the 24 of 
stage 1. In each round they were randomly matched with another participant in the room, and 
informed whether the co-player belonged to the blue group or to the red group or to no group, 
though they were not told their identity. They were assigned at least once the role of trusters 
and at least once that of trustees. They were provided, on a round-by-round basis, with a table 
containing information on average giving rates and average return rates by members of each 
group (or “not belonging to any group”) with respect to insiders and outsiders. In addition, 
they received a summary table with average giving and return rates for each stage from the 
second onwards by members of each group with respect to insiders and outsiders. 
Market for groups phase. Before stages 2, 3 and 4 of the trust games were played, there 
was a market for groups as in HHZ. Subjects were given an endowment of 48 points. In the 
two groups frame treatments, they were first asked to state whether, if they could choose and 
both options were free, they would rather stay in their group or switch to the other. If he or 
she stated they would rather switch, then they became a potential buyer for the membership 
of the other group and they were asked how much they were willing to pay to swap places 
with a member of the other group. They could state any value between 0 and 48 points, the 
value of her endowment. Using this method we measured the WTP of agents, with a common 
upper limit of 48 points chosen to avoid bankruptcy problems or the dependence of the WTP 
range on previously earned money. Similarly, if the subject stated they would rather stay, 
they became  a potential seller of group membership and he or she was asked to state how 
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 They were asked to make decisions within 1 minute and a half, and a small clock on the computer display 
informed them of how much time they had. In practice, however, they could take more, though they rarely did. 
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much they would need to be paid by a member of the other group in order to swap places, 
again with a an upper limit of 48 points. Subjects were also given the option to state that they 
were not willing to switch group at any price within the allowed range (0 to 48 points). Using 
this method we obtained information on the WTA of agents. 
The one group frame treatments were identical in structure but the instructions were 
framed in terms of being in or out of the Blue group. For all treatments, the market then 
operated as a Walrasian clearinghouse, where the price was set so that the number of sellers 
was equal to the number of buyers of membership of the other group. Whenever there was a 
range of possible market-clearing prices, the lowest market-clearing price was chosen. As in 
HHZ, the mechanism only operated by swapping players between groups, so that each group 
remained with the same number of subjects throughout the experiment.17 
D.  End of Experiment Tasks 
At the end of the experiment we had four behavioral tasks presented in randomized 
order and aimed to try to measure risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and 
sensitivity to experimenter demand.18 They corresponded to (a) a standard Holt and Laury 
(2002) questionnaire in the domain of gains; (b) an equivalent task in the domain of losses; 
(c) an ambiguity aversion task; and (d) a sensitivity to experimenter demand task. The tasks 
details are provided in the experimental instructions. The number of times subjects choose the 
safer option can be taken as a measure of risk attitude in task a. Task b consisted in a set of 
choices between risky options as in a, but framed in terms of losses rather than in gains; we 
combine task a choices of the safer option with task b choices of the riskier option to get a 
proxy for degree of loss aversion.19 Task c followed the lead of Engle-Warnick and Laszlo 
(2006) and offered a choice between an increasingly ambiguous lottery and the same lottery 
disambiguated but at a price in terms of lower expected value. The number of times subjects 
went for the unambiguous measure can be used as a measure of ambiguous aversion. 
Task d presented an option between two lottery choices, one increasingly dominated by 
the other; the dominated option was characterized by a smiley face and a sentence stating that 
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 Subjects were told that they should make their market decisions within four minutes. 
18
 Due to a computer failure, we were not able to collect this data for one session of treatment 88. 
19
 A loss aversion subject would be risk loving in the domain of losses while being risk averse in the domain of 
gains. 
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“it would be nice if some of you were to choose” such an option. The nudge provided 
towards choosing the dominated lotteries was significant by the standard of what we know 
about experimenter demand characteristics (see Zizzo, 2010), with the smiley face providing 
a social cue to interpret the sentence being provided.20 As a result, we measure the degree of 
sensitivity to experimenter demand as the number of dominated options choices being made. 
E. Payments 
Each session lasted around 75 minutes. The average earnings were 14.39 UK pounds 
per subject (approximately 22-23 US dollars). Payment was based on the earnings from each 
of the markets; plus those from a randomly chosen round from each of the four stages; plus 
those from one of the ten choices for each of the end of experiment tasks, with any relevant 
lottery being played out by the computer. Subjects were privately paid and left the laboratory 
one at a time in an order designed to minimize the likelihood of seeing each other. 
F.  Relationship to Baseline Treatments from HHZ 
The 1G66 treatment was identical in stages 1 through 4 structure to that of our 
experimental treatments under a two groups frame, with the key difference being that there 
were two groups of six subjects.21 The B treatment had 12 subjects per session as the 66, 84, 
S8 and S4 treatments. There was no assignment to groups. Stage 1 was identical to stage 1 of 
the other treatments. Stages 2, 3 and 4 had no market for groups. In its place, at the beginning 
of each of stages 2, 3 and 4, there was a two minutes waiting period, at the start of which 
subjects were paid an additional 48 points. This was meant to mirror the other treatments, 
both by providing the same money amounts and by creating a temporal wedge between trust 
game tasks. Stage 2, 3 and 4 trust games were as in the other treatments, to mirror the 
information provided in stages 2, 3 and 4 of the other treatments, the computer screen 
displayed information on average giving rate and average return rate, with a summary table 
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 Note that we could not say that “it would be nice if all of you were to choose” the dominated option, since 
this sentence would in fact have been deceptive given our experimental goals (the usefulness of the measure is 
in having a distribution of subjects based on the measure). We further discuss the validity of this measure in 
section 4. 
21
 A second small difference concerned the matching rule. HHZ’s matching rule ensure that in every stage 
subjects were precisely matched the same number of times with insiders and outsiders, although this implied 
that the likelihood of being rematched with insiders and outsiders was slightly different. We could not retain this 
constraint with the uneven number of subjects in our key treatments and so we opted instead for pure random 
matching in our experiment, with any other subject in the room being equally likely to be matched with any 
given subject, no matter the group. 
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on average giving and return rates from stage 2 onwards being provided at the end of each 
stage. None of the HHZ treatments tried to control for risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity 
aversion and experimenter demand sensitivity by the means of end of experiment tasks.  
 
3. Experimental Results 
A. Giving and Return Rates: Bivariate Tests 
We define the giving rate as the fraction of the endowment given by trusters to trustees, 
and the return rate as the fraction of the amount received by trusters which is returned by the 
trustees to the trusters (where the amount received by trustees is 3 times what was given in all 
treatments except SI, where it is either 2 or 4 times what was given).  
(Insert Table 2 about here.) 
Table 2 shows the average giving and return rates in each experimental treatment plus 
the HHZ baselines. If we focus on our experimental treatments and on stages 2-4 where 
group information is known, we find that in 21 sessions out of 26 giving rates were lower in 
stages 2-4 relative to stage 1 (Wilcoxon P  < 0.001),22 while in 25 sessions out of 26 return 
rates were lower in stages 2-4 relative to stage 1 (Wilcoxon P < 0.001).23 This replicates what 
was found in HHZ. 
There is overall evidence of ingroup favoritism across our experimental treatments: 
giving rates and return rates are lower for other subjects with the same group status than for 
those with a different group status (Mann Whitney P = 0.031 in both cases). We can 
determine whether this discrimination is positive or negative by comparing stages 2-4 giving 
and return rates towards insiders and outsiders against the stages 2-4 baseline of the B 
treatment.  
There is no evidence from Table 2 that trusters give more to ingroup members in the 
group treatments, including all new experimental treatments, than in the baseline with no 
groups. As a result, there is no preliminary aggregate evidence of positive discrimination, i.e. 
that cooperation is higher with insiders than it would be if there were no groups. The 
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 Throughout this paper, all reported tests are two tailed except where otherwise specified. 
23
 Here and elsewhere, statistical significance is estimated by treating session averages as the unit of 
observation, in order to control for possible non-independence of choices within each session. In all the 66 
treatment sessions stage 2-4 giving rates and return rates are lower than in stage 1. 
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evidence seems to suggest that, if anything, same group status giving rate is lower than in the 
B baseline (Mann Whitney P = 0.027);  the robustness of this result will need to be verified in 
the regression analysis. Same group status return rates are either the same or lower than 
return rates in B (Mann Whitney P = 0.090).24 
There is preliminary evidence from Table 2 suggesting that there is aggregate negative 
discrimination, although there seems to be variation in the extent to which this operates 
across treatments. Giving and return rates to different group status subjects are both lower 
than B treatment giving and return rates (Mann Whitney P = 0.001 and 0.011, respectively).25 
One problem with interpreting discrimination in return rates is that subjects may simply 
return proportionally less because they have been given less. This might occur for a number 
of psychological motives which have been documented in other experiments, such as 
inequality aversion (Ernst Fehr and Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999), reciprocity (Armin Falk and 
Urs Fischbacher, 2001) or trust responsiveness (Gerardo Guerra and Daniel John Zizzo, 
2004). We can control for this in regression analysis on return rates, which we shall present 
shortly. 
Pure group size effects can be investigated by considering treatments 44, 66 and 88, 
where the group size effect is not combined with those of majority-minority relationship or 
one group framing. The one statistically significant result we find is that 88 subjects return 
more to subjects of the other group than 44 and 66 (Mann Whitney P = 0.039), and this is 
reflected in lower discrimination in return rates (Mann Whitney P = 0.039). 
Figure 1 displays giving and return rates highlighting the role of majorities, minorities 
and one group framing.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here.) 
In Mann Whitney tests, we find no evidence of different giving and return rates relative 
to treatments with no group size inequality in Mann Whitney tests. Both majorities 
(Wilcoxon P = 0.007) and minorities (Wilcoxon P = 0.049) discriminate against different 
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 These results are not dependent on our inclusion of 66 from HHZ in the sample. If we exclude the 66 
treatment, the respective Mann Whitney P values are P = 0.004 and P = 0.068 with respect to same group status 
giving and return rates, respectively. 
25
 Again, this result is robust to excluding 66 from the sample, with regards to both other group giving and 
return rates (Mann Whitney P = 0.001 and P = 0.016, respectively). 
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group status subjects with respect to giving rates, while there is not sufficiently strong session 
level evidence of discrimination in return rates on the part of majorities (Wilcoxon P = 0.379) 
or minorities (Wilcoxon P = 0.301) to achieve statistical significance. Obviously the 
regression analysis will be useful to verify the robustness of this result. 
What Figure 1 clearly shows, in relation to one frame treatment sessions, is that Not 
Blue subjects give less on average; this appears driven by lower giving to other Not Blue 
subjects (Wilcoxon P = 0.021). While Blue trusters gave 40.6% of their endowment to other 
Blue trusters, Not Blue trusters only gave 27.1% of their endowment (Wilcoxon P = 0.039).  
B. Giving and Return Rates: Regression Analysis 
The above analysis is preliminary both because it conservatively operates purely at the 
session level and because bivariate tests obviously miss out on the effects of covariates, such 
as behavioral reciprocity in the case of return rates. Table 3 employs regression analysis on 
mean Stage 2-4 giving and return rate by each subject to verify treatment effects, and the role 
of possible covariates, in a fine-grained way. 
(Insert Table 3 about here.) 
In the regressions, error clustering is used to take into account the possible non-
independence of observations by different subjects in the same session.26 We have treatment 
dummies for Group (=1 in all treatments except B), GruopOf8 and GroupOf4 (=1 if subject 
belongs to group of 8 subjects or 4 subjects, respectively), Majority (=1 if subject belongs to 
strict majority), Minority (=1 if subject belongs to strict minority) and NotBlue (=1 if subject 
is in the a low status framed subject). The return rates regressions have Giving Rate received 
as the Second Mover as an independent variable: that is, the mean stages 2-4 giving rate the 
subject has received when playing as a trustee. This allows us to control for the positive 
relationship which we might expect between giving rate and return rate. Both giving and 
return rate regressions control for Stage 1 giving and return rates. Finally, there are a number 
of dummy variables that capture individual-specific heterogeneity: stage 1 giving and return 
rate, age, and dummies for gender (= 1 for women), economics or management educational 
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 We have also run random effects regressions getting the same broad picture in terms of mean giving rates, 
whereas estimates of regressions on mean return rates collapses to OLS estimates due to zero variance being 
explained by the session level random coefficients; this leaves OLS with error clustering as the better estimation 
option. 
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background (= 1 if applicable) and nationality (UK = 1 for UK subjects and China = 1 for 
Chinese subjects). 
Models 1 and 3 in Table 3 show that, although negatively signed, the introduction of 
groups per se does not decrease giving and return rates to subjects with the same group 
status; of course, it also does not increase them. Models 2 and 4 show that, when controlling 
for a number of covariates including (in relation to return rates) behavioral reciprocity, the 
introduction of groups decreases giving rates by around 20% and return rates by around 9%.  
 
RESULT 1. There is no evidence of positive discrimination. There is evidence for 
negative discrimination both in giving rates and in return rates. 
 
However, low status subjects give 11% less to other low status subjects (P = 0.037); 
return rates to other low status subjects also appear lower but miss statistical significance in a 
two tailed test (P = 0.107);  while there is no statistically significant evidence that low status 
subjects decrease their giving or return rates towards high status subjects.  
 
RESULT 2. Low status subjects trust less other low status subjects  
 
Result 2 agrees with our findings from the behavioral tests in section B. The one other 
treatment variable that is statistically significant in Table 3 is Minority in relation to the 
return rate to different group status subjects: minority subjects give more to majority subjects, 
and this is statistically significant (P = 0.037). 
 
RESULT 3. Minority subjects return more to majority subjects. 
 
Results 2 and 3 offer potential qualifications to Result 1, to the extent that they operate 
in the direction of reducing discrimination, either in giving rates (Not Blue, low status 
subjects) or in return rates (minorities). We shall investigate this more in the next section, 
which will present regressions on the extent of discrimination. 
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No other treatment variable is statistically significant in Table 3. Among the other 
covariates, there is evidence of behavioral reciprocity in Models 1, 2 and 3, though less so in 
Model 4 (P = 0.064 one tailed). There is also various (though not universal) evidence of 
dependence on giving and/or return rates in stage 1, which may be due to a combination of 
individual characteristics and learning dynamics.27 No individual specific dummy variable is 
statistically significant at P < 0.05 or better, although there is marginal evidence (P < 0.1) for 
UK subjects to give more (Models 1 and 2) and for Chinese students to return less to different 
group status subjects (Model 4). 
C. Perceived Values and Discrimination 
We now focus on the treatments with groups. This is (a) to try to get an understanding 
about whether subjects value groups equally depending on whether they are majority or 
minority groups, or whether they are framed as not belonging to any group at all; and (b) to 
get a better understanding of discrimination using perceived value information and, in the 
subset of experimental treatments that we ran (and so excluding 66 from HHZ), information 
from the end of experiment tasks. 
Perceived value measurement. Following HHZ, we measure perceived value subjects 
placed on own group membership by the extent to which subjects place a value on own group 
membership in excess of its material value. The markets at the start of stages 2, 3 and 4 in the 
C, SG, SF and SI treatments (and stages 3 and 4 in SM) provided an incentive-compatible 
mechanism for the revelation of individual preferences for staying in one’s own group (the 
willingness to accept, WTA, value) or for switching groups (the willingness to pay, WTP, 
value). As there were repeated markets, subjects also had the opportunity to gain experience 
both about the nature of the social commodity being traded (i.e. membership of a given 
group) and about the market mechanism itself.28 
WTA(own) is the positive price a subject needed to be paid to be willing to switch and 
WTP(own) is equivalent to a negative price on own group membership, and so they reveal 
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 The two may of course interact: for example, subjects may acquire information about the social preference 
distribution in the population by the stage 1 play experience (e.g., David Levine, 1998). 
28
 HHZ discuss whether this is a genuine psychological benefit rather than the artifact of well known 
mechanisms, like reference dependence. They conclude that, at least partially, it corresponds to genuine 
perceived value.  
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the value that an individual places on membership of his or her group.29 Figure 2 provides 
information on WTA and WTP values observed in the experiments. 
(Insert Figure 2 about here.) 
We use HHZ’s simple perceived value measure M as equal for each subject and market 
to WTA(own) or – WTP(own), whichever is the case.30 Unlike in most of HHZ’s treatments, 
all of our experimental treatments, and 66 from HHZ, are such that group membership does 
not imply, either directly or in terms of frequency of interaction, a financial advantage in 
being inside rather than outside a group.31  
One problem with the average M measure of the mean psychological benefit from own 
group membership is that subjects could state that they were not willing to lose their 
membership at any allowed price between 0 and 48 points. 9.5% of the choices were of this 
‘definite stay’ kind (between 5.6 and 13.4% in different treatments). As in HHZ, we opted for 
two routes to deal with this problem. M contains all observations, but conservatively 
introduces a valuation of 49 for these definite stays:32 since the lower bound for valuations 
was – 48 (the budget), if anything, for x > 49, this introduces a downward bias. Mb simply 
omits ‘definite stay’ observations and also introduces a downward bias in average M1 
estimates. Either way, in the light of possible downward biases, our average M1 estimates 
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 A price of zero was also a possibility, allowed by the experimental program in relation both to WTA and 
WTP valuations. Therefore, technically we always had a non-negative price (WTA(own)) or a non-positive 
price (WTP(own)), with one further qualification to be mentioned shortly. 
30
 In HHZ, this is the most effective measure in predicting discrimination. Note that in each market subjects 
either choose a WTA or choose a WTP; they do not do both. Hence, a strategy by which a subject places both a 
WTA and a WTP is not feasible. In addition, a strategy of putting a a high WTA just in case there is an 
opportunity of making money, rather than because of a desire to sticking with one’s own group, is not incentive 
compatible: if I do not care about which group to be in, even if I am offered a single unit I should rationally 
oblige and accept, and therefore I should place a WTA = 1.  
31
 However, we also carried robustness checks in our analysis by computing the equivalent of the M2 and M3 
measures in HHZ: M2 is equal to M1 minus the expectation of the material gain from a switch when these 
expectations are formed adaptively (i.e., the expected relative material/gain is the same as that in the last stage 
for the markets at the start of stages 3 and 4, and to zero for the market at the start of stage 2 as no past 
information on relative group trustworthiness is then available); and M3 is equal to M1 minus the expectation of 
the material gain from a switch when these expectations are formed rationally (i.e., the expected relative 
material gain/loss is the same as actually occurs). 
32
 We chose the closest integer value to 48 in keeping with the experimental procedure, where for simplicity 
subjects could only provide integer valuations: therefore, 49 is the lowest value in keeping with this constraint. 
In terms of upward bias of perceived value estimates, the ‘worst case scenario’ for this modeling choice would 
be if all six agents had a true value of 48.001 and preferred not to round their valuation to 48; even in this stress 
case scenario, the implied upward bias would only be 0.5. In practice, none of our key results would change if 
we were to choose a value, say, of 48.001 for ‘definite stay’ cases. 
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should be interpreted as conservative estimates of the revealed perceived values of own group 
membership. 
Results on perceived values. Table 4 presents M and Mb mean values by treatment, 
while Figure 3 illustrates mean M values graphically.33 
(Insert Table 4 and Figure 3 about here.)  
The perceived value of groups is positive in all the sessions and whatever the measure 
used (Wicoxon P < 0.001); in the market with the greatest experience, namely the stage 4 
market, it is 21 on average for M and 17 for Mb. We are not able to detect statistically 
significantly differences between aggregate majority and minority mean values. In contrast, 
in the differential status treatments, Not Blue subjects perceive value of not Blue membership 
as being markedly lower than that of Blue subjects (Wicoxon P < 0.007 in relation to the M 
measure and P < 0.037 in relation to the Mb measure): for example, in treatment S8 Blue’s 
mean perceived value is 28 points, whereas not Blue’s mean perceived value is just 13 points, 
i.e. just around half as much.34 
To investigate the determinants of psychological value further, we present some 
regression analysis on M (regressions 5 and 7) and Mb (regressions 6 and 8) in Table 5, again 
controlling for possible session level specific effects by using error clustering.35 
(Insert Table 5 about here.) 
The independent variables are all those from Table 3 that can be defined in the 
subsample. Regressions 7 and 8 restrict the samples to those sessions for which end of 
experiment tasks have been measured and therefore, while losing statistical power, are able to 
include proxies for Risk Aversion, Loss Aversion, Ambiguity Aversion and Conformism. 
Risk aversion is proxied by the number of risk averse choices in the domain of gains; Loss 
Aversion by the sum of risk averse choices in the domain of gains and risk loving choices in 
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 The same aggregate value result if HHZ M2 and M3 values are used instead. 
34
 The contrast remains if M2 and M3 are used, and so does not appear to be explained by different group 
membership profitability expectations. Table 4 also shows that the gap in perceived value persists throughout 
the experiment. One implication of high perceived values is social inertia, in the sense that subjects tend to stay 
in their group rather than switch: only 11.6% of choices result in a group switching deal (between 8.9% and 
14.8% depending on the treatment). 
35
 Random effects regressions on psychological value collapse to OLS estimates due to zero variance being 
explained by the session level random coefficients; this again leaves OLS with error clustering as the better 
estimation option.  
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the domain of losses; Ambiguity Aversion and Conformism respectively by the number of 
ambiguity averse and socially conformist choices.    
Majority and NotBlue are significant at P < 0.05 or better across all four regressions: 
subjects are willing to pay 7-9 points more on average for being in a majority group (P < 
0.01) and they are willing to pay less for being low status members by 13-16 points (P < 
0.001).  
 
RESULT 4. When covariates are controlled for, subjects appear to like being in 
majorities. 
 
RESULT 5. In the differential status treatments, subjects dislike being in the low status 
group. 
 
Both results are plausible and will be discussed in section 4. Chinese subjects appear to 
value group membership less, but the effect only holds in regressions 7 and 8. 
Explaining discrimination. Let DGivingRate (DReturnRate) be equal to mean giving 
(return) rate by a subject to same group status subjects minus mean giving (return) rate by the 
same subject to different group status subjects. To probe more deeply in explaining 
discrimination, we ran regressions, controlling for session specific effects using error 
clustering, on DGivingRate (regressions 9-14) and DReturnRate (regressions 15-20).36 The 
results of these regressions are given in Table 6.  
(Insert Table 6 about here.) 
Regression 9 contains the same independent variables as the regressions in Table 5. 
Regression 10 adds the M variable and regression 11 adds interaction terms between M and 
GroupOf8, Majority, Minority and NotBlue. Regressions 12-14 are the corresponding 
regressions adding the end of experiment task variables (and working on the subset of 
sessions for which the end of experiment task data is available). Regressions 15-20 are the 
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 Random effects regressions on DAvgGivingRate give similar qualitative results, while those on 
DAvgReturnRate once again collapse to OLS estimates due to zero variance being explained by the session 
level random coefficients 
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corresponding regressions to Regressions 9-14 but with DReturnRate as the dependent 
variable and DGiving Rate as Second Mover as an added independent variable (defined as the 
giving rate from insiders minus the giving rate from outsiders which the subject has 
experienced as a trustee).37  
Regressions 9 and 12 show that NotBlue subjects discriminate less by about 8%. This 
agrees with the earlier finding, summarized in Result 2, that being labeled as an outsider to 
the one group depresses giving rates to other outsiders. We also just determined that NotBlue 
is a strong negative predictor of perceived value (Result 5 and Table 5). That being the case, 
it is not surprising that NotBlue becomes statistically insignificant as perceived value 
measures are introduced: its effect appears to operate through the impact it has on perceived 
value, which, in turn and as in HHZ, predicts less discrimination in giving. The natural 
interpretation of this is that, because low status subjects dislike being low status, they 
discriminate less in giving.  
  
RESULT 6. Subjects who value their group more give comparatively more to insiders 
relatively to outsiders.  
 
RESULT 7. In the differential status treatment, as they place a lower perceived value on 
their own group status, low status subjects discriminate less in giving rates between insiders 
and outsiders. 
 
No other variable is statistically significant in the DGivingRate regressions.  The 
picture from the DReturnRate regressions is more complicated. Subjects who place more 
value on their own group discriminate less rather than more (at least P < 0.05 in regressions 
16-17, 19-20). This finding is in contrast to HHZ and will be discussed in section 4 together 
with Result 6. We also find that M × NotBlue is negative and statistically significant (P < 
0.05 in regressions 19 and 20): subjects who are more content with being low status subjects, 
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 We report only M variable regressions to have more statistical power. However, results are similar if the Mb 
variable is used instead as the dependent variable. We have also tried to replace M with M2 or M3. As a 
predictor of discrimination, M2 generally works as effectively as M, while M3 tends to be less effective in 
predicting discrimination: these results replicate HHZ (p. 413, footnote 29).  
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therefore placing higher M value on their own group, are less likely to discriminate in return 
rates. 
 
RESULT 8. Subjects who value their group more return comparatively less to insiders 
relatively to outsiders. 
 
RESULT 9. In the differential status treatment, low status subjects discriminate less in 
return rates between insiders and outsiders. 
 
We also find that, when controlling for the M interaction terms, there is evidence that 
minority subjects discriminate less (P < 0.05 in regressions 17 and 20); this may be seen as an 
implication of Result 3 above that minority subjects return more to majority subjects.  
 
RESULT 10. When covariates are controlled for, minority subjects discriminate less in 
return rates against majority subjects. 
 
British students appear to discriminate more in regressions 15-17 (P < 0.05), but this 
effect disappears when controlling for end of experiment task measures as in regression 18-
20. Similarly, the standard prediction of behavioral reciprocity (in this case being the victim 
of more discrimination in giving rates implying greater discrimination in return rates) 
receives some mild support in regressions 15-17 (P < 0.05 if one tailed test) but this is no 
longer the case in regressions 18-20. There is some evidence from regressions 18-20 that risk 
averse subjects appear to discriminate less (P < 0.05 or 0.06), loss averse subjects appear to 
discriminate more (P < 0.05 or 0.06) and ambiguity averse also appear to discriminate more 
(P < 0.05 or 0.05); our measure of social conformism however is uncorrelated with behavior. 
 
RESULT 11. To the extent that they are proxied by our measure of social conformism, 
experimenter demand effects do not explain perceived value or discrimination in either giving 
or return rates. 
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4. Discussion 
Do relative group size and social status affect the basic finding of intergroup 
discrimination found in HHZ, Yan Chen and Sherry Xin Li (2009), Gary Charness et al. 
(2007), and elsewhere? The answer is a possible yes for relative group size effects, and a very 
likely yes for social status effects. In the psychological research, majorities and minorities 
can both display ingroup bias (Geoffrey J. Leonardelli and Marilynn B. Brewer, 2001), 
though with more bias typically expressed by minority groups (e.g., Brian Mullen et al., 
1992); we do find the reverse potential asymmetry, insofar as minority subjects discriminate 
less in return rates against majority subjects when covariates are controlled for (Result 10); 
and this appears to be connected to greater giving to majority members (Result 3). Three 
obvious qualifiers to our finding apply. First, our group identity manipulation is minimal, 
and, while this is a good first step to allow interpretability, it is possible that stronger group 
manipulations may be required to obtain larger or different asymmetries in behavioral results; 
we know that in other settings the strength of group manipulation does affect behavioral 
findings (e.g., Gary Charness et al. 2007; Roy Chen and Yan Chen, 2010). Second, we cannot 
rule out that different findings might follow from more unbalanced group manipulations. As 
noted in an earlier footnote, random matching was required to avoid different frequencies of 
play with insiders and outsiders depending on group membership, and, as a by-product of 
random matching, we required sufficiently large minority groups to ensure that subjects 
played with both insiders and outsiders and we maximized statistical power. However, more 
unbalanced groups is an obvious direction for future research. Third, we do find that, once 
covariates are controlled for, subjects like being in majority groups (Result 4); this agrees 
with psychological research that shows lower satisfaction from minority members relative to 
majority members (Markus Lücken and Bernd Simon, 2005). 
We find a greater behavioral impact from our minimal social status manipulation, and 
this is the more striking precisely because it is a minimal manipulation. Low status subjects 
gave 11% less to other low status subjects (Result 2), they discriminated less in giving rates 
(Result 7) and discriminated less also in return rates (Result 9). It appears that, while still 
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placing a positive value on own group membership, this value is considerably less than that 
for high status subjects. In turn, as we find (as in HHZ) that greater own group valuation 
increases discrimination in giving rates, the reduced difference in valuations between groups 
underlies reduced discrimination, although this works not by bringing the high status subjects 
but rather by bringing the other low status subjects down. 
The point that, as shown by Tables 6 and 4 respectively, ingroup favoritism and 
positive perceived value are still present on average with low status subjects is a significant 
one in the following sense. One potential criticism of our minimal status manipulation is that 
what we are really inducing is the perception of not being in any group. That a positive 
valuation is still placed on average on own group membership, and that overall discrimination 
is still present (at least when covariates are taken into account), is useful information because 
it implies that Not Blue subjects still perceive themselves as a group (if a less desirable, low 
status group) as opposed to perceive themselves as belonging to no group.38 There are also 
real world examples, such as the traditional Japanese caste system discussed in the 
introduction, where being classified as outsiders to the high status group or groups is the 
defining feature of how the low status group is identified. 
It is also interesting to compare these results with those from the psychological 
research, in relation to which the stylized finding is that, while not universally so, low status 
groups tend to display outgroup favoritism as opposed to the usual ingroup bias (e.g., Steve 
Hinkle and Rupert Brown, 1990; John T. Jost and Diana Burgess, 2000; Miles Hewstone et 
al., 2002). It is difficult to say how much of this stark result is due to a combination of having 
attitudinal studies, non incentivized and/or replete with deception; it is clear though that the 
psychological research is right in suggesting that low status group members value less own 
group membership and treat outgroup members comparatively less unkindly than high status 
subjects would. In addition, our study replicates the psychological finding that low status 
subjects get lower satisfaction from group membership than on high status subjects (e.g., 
Naomi Ellemers et al., 1988, 1992; Itesh Sachdev and Richard Y. Bourhis, 1987); so do 
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 For example, in all 10 status differential sessions Not Blue perceived values were equal to 0 (sign test P  = 
0.005 in relation to both M and Mb).  
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minority subjects, with minorities generally being perceived more negatively than majorities 
(Viviane Seyranian et al., 2008).  
One overall interpretation of these results is that low status subjects appear to have low 
morale and this negatively affects the extent to which subjects are willing to trust and 
reciprocate; and, since there is no symmetrical effect on the part of high status subjects, 
managers and policy makers need to be aware of the potential unintended consequences for 
trust and trustworthiness of creating status based group partitions in an organization. The 
further warning for policy makers and managers is the obvious one: namely, as our global 
finding is one of negative discrimination as in HHZ, this also should operate as a cautionary 
tale against necessarily equating groups with a beneficial increase in social capital, although 
of course this is likely not to be true in other settings to the same extent and further research 
is needed. 
One finding which is inconsistent with HHZ is that, in return rate regressions, higher 
perceived own group value is associated with less discrimination. If our result were 
replicated, one possible interpretation of this would be along the lines that more stringent 
expectations of trust are associated with members of one’s own group, leading to lower return 
rates for each given level of trust. Put it differently, insiders would feel more let down by any 
given level of trust from insiders ‘like them’ (Michael Bacharach et al., 2007; Pierpaolo 
Battigalli and Martin Dufwenberg, 2007), and as a result they would feel less incline to fulfill 
trust as a result. Obviously, however, future research needs to determine the extent to which 
ours is a genuine result, given the inconsistency of our result with HHZ’s, let alone whether 
our interpretation has some merit. 
We did not find that our Charles A. Holt and Susan K. Laury (2002) related measures 
of risk aversion, loss aversion, ambiguity aversion and experimenter demand effects 
explained behavior. In relation specifically to our measure of experimenter demand effects 
(Result 11), an alternative interpretation is that it captures subjects being nice towards the 
experimenter as opposed to a form of experimenter demand effect. The problem with this 
argument is that being nice towards the experimenter could precisely be interpreted as a form 
of experimenter demand effect; while the argument that the manipulation simply captures 
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subjects being nice, i.e. altruistic, does not explain why it does not correlate with greater 
average trust or trustworthiness. Furthermore, the fact that face based stimuli are sufficient to 
induce compliant behavior (e.g., Melissa Bateson et al., 2006; Terence Burnham and Brian 
Hare, 2007; Kevin J. Haley and Daniel M. T. Fessler, 2005) makes clear that such visual aids 
are effective in providing social meaning towards the choice of the dominated option.39 The 
fact that our results are robust to our experimenter demand effect instrument is at least 
suggestive evidence that such effects are not a problem in our experiment, or at least they are 
less of a problem than in most other experiments given the subtlety of the social statue cue 
involved.40 
There is a potential parallelism between our findings on minority subjects and our 
findings on low status subjects; in both cases, there is evidence of comparative unhappiness 
with one’s own position and of muted discrimination towards outsiders, though the latter 
operates differently for the two cases. It is too early to say whether, in a sense and contrarily 
to the psychological research that emphasizes the differences between the two types of 
treatment manipulations (e.g., Miles Hewstone et al., 2002), subjects perceived being in a 
minority as being of low status. If replicated, however, as an approximate simplification for a 
number (though by no means all) of real world cases, it would obviously be a useful finding 
for economists, managers and policy makers. 
 
5. Conclusions 
We have presented an experiment which employed trust games to look at the impact on 
well-being, cooperation and social capital from having comparative majority/minority groups 
and differential status groups. We generally replicated the basic finding of negative 
intergroup discrimination that was found in HHZ. We found that minority subjects appeared 
to discriminate less and comparatively dislike being in the minority; and that, and to a greater 
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 In work done for another experiment (Piers Fleming and Daniel J. Zizzo, 2010), this behavioral measure has 
been found to be significantly related to Joachim Stöber (2001) standard 17 items psychological questionnaire 
measure of sensitivity to social desirability pressures (Spearman ρ = 0.226, P = 0.017, n = 112). This further 
validates our interpretation of choices of the dominated option as sensitivity to experimenter demand 
characteristics. 
40
 Further, if more indirect and less cogent, evidence against this interpretation of the results is provided by the 
fact that it cannot explain why we find that perceived values are a significant predictor of behavior, or arguably 
why we observe systematically negative as opposed to positive discrimination. 
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degree, low status subjects comparatively disliked being low status and discriminated less by 
pulling other low status subjects down. There is at least a partial parallelism between the 
effects of our majority/minority manipulation and of our group status manipulation, which 
might suggest that, in many real world cases, minority subjects do perceive themselves as 
having low status (although of course sometimes the reverse is true). It appears that the 
negative implications for well being, cooperation and social capital from group partitions 
may be differentially distributed across different sets of people, and potentially worse in 
relation to status manipulations, when we allow for differential group sizes and for 
differential group status, even when introduced in a minimal way. Obviously, further research 
is needed to verify the robustness of our results. 
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Notes: The histograms are built from individual choices; n = 210 for -WTP observations 
(mean = 9.986, standard deviation (s.d.) = 11.759) and n =  810 (mean = 30.095, s.d. = 
16.132) for WTA observations. The white column stands for choices of not being willing to 
accept any price up to 48 to switch group.  
 
Figure 2. Histogram of Willingness to Pay (WTP) and Willingness to Accept (WTA) in 
Relation to the Other Group 
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Table 1 ― Experimental Sequence 
 
Experimental sequence Task Number of rounds 
Stage 1 Trust games 3 
Stage 2 Market 1 or Waiting Period 1, trust games 6 
Stage 3 Market 2 or Waiting Period 2, trust games 6 
Stage 4 Market 3 or Waiting Period 3, trust games 6 
 
Notes: At the start of each of stages 2, 3, and 4, the experiment had a waiting period in the B 
treatment, and markets for group(s) in the 66, 88, 44, 84, S8 and S4 treatments (technically, 
there were two markets, one to pay for membership of each of the two groups).  
 
 
Table 2 ― Giving and Return Rates 
 
    B 66 88 44 84 S8 S4 
Stage 1 giving rate 0.562 0.457 0.433 0.350 0.367 0.477 0.413 
Stage 2–4 giving rate 0.558 0.369 0.316 0.303 0.305 0.318 0.275 
to own group members 0.449 0.348 0.344 0.333 0.334 0.319 
to other group members 0.288 0.289 0.249 0.265 0.296 0.213 
Stage 1 return rate 0.318 0.219 0.270 0.304 0.226 0.270 0.238 
Stage 2–4 return rate 0.252 0.153 0.173 0.157 0.166 0.189 0.163 
to own group members 0.200 0.185 0.187 0.177 0.204 0.170 
  to other group members   0.106 0.161 0.110 0.148 0.168 0.151 
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Table 3 ― Regressions on Mean Giving and Return Rate 
 
Regressions on stage 2–4 Regression 1   Regression 2 
mean giving rate β t p   β t p 
 To own group To other group 
Stage 1 giving rate 0.424 7.930 0.000 0.293 5.510 0.000 
Stage 1 return rate 0.143 1.920 0.064 0.242 3.320 0.002 
Group -0.059 -0.720 0.477 -0.214 -3.160 0.003 
GroupOf8 -0.061 -0.630 0.536 0.012 0.200 0.841 
GroupOf4 -0.040 -0.430 0.669 -0.017 -0.290 0.771 
Majority -0.010 -0.130 0.899 -0.045 -1.150 0.258 
Minority 0.020 0.290 0.774 0.061 1.270 0.211 
NotBlue -0.117 -2.170 0.037 -0.048 -0.980 0.335 
Gender -0.040 -1.340 0.190 -0.004 -0.120 0.904 
EcMgt -0.012 -0.400 0.695 -0.021 -0.890 0.380 
UK 0.062 2.000 0.053 0.039 1.770 0.086 
China 0.015 0.300 0.764 -0.023 -0.550 0.588 
Age 0.000 -0.140 0.890 0.002 1.090 0.284 
Constant 0.272 3.320 0.002 0.246 3.290 0.002 
Regressions on stage 2–4 Regression 3   Regression 4 
mean return rate β t p   β t p 
 To own group To other group 
Trust rate as 2nd mover 0.131 2.380 0.023 0.089 1.560 0.128 
Stage 1 giving rate 0.060 1.820 0.078 0.015 0.510 0.615 
Stage 1 return rate 0.186 2.670 0.012 0.230 5.620 0.000 
Group -0.009 -0.280 0.783 -0.095 -2.600 0.014 
GroupOf8 -0.003 -0.120 0.906 0.036 1.510 0.141 
GroupOf4 -0.012 -0.450 0.657 -0.014 -0.580 0.568 
Majority -0.006 -0.300 0.765 -0.005 -0.200 0.845 
Minority 0.013 0.350 0.731 0.069 2.170 0.037 
NotBlue -0.026 -1.350 0.186 -0.031 -1.320 0.197 
Gender -0.029 -1.600 0.120 -0.019 -0.860 0.396 
EcMgt -0.031 -1.630 0.112 0.014 0.530 0.599 
UK -0.012 -0.620 0.542 -0.019 -1.020 0.316 
China -0.015 -0.590 0.561 -0.057 -1.930 0.062 
Age 0.000 0.240 0.808 0.001 0.430 0.671 
Constant 0.100 1.790 0.083 0.126 1.950 0.059 
 
Notes: n = 328, R2 = 0.324 for Regression 1, n = 327, R2 = 0.366 for Regression 2, n = 324, 
R2 = 0.175 for Regression 3 and n = 318, R2 = 0.234 for Regression 4. We employ error 
clustering to control for session level effects. 
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Table 4 ― Mean Psychological Values 
 
Treatment Stage M Mb 
      Majority Minority     Majority Minority 
66 2 21.04 19.83 
3 24.65 23.02 
4 21.06 17.81 
Total 22.25 20.25 
88 2 21.11 20.03 
3 17.91 15.84 
4 20.09 16.88 
Total 19.70 17.61 
44 2 24.95 24.33 
3 24.40 22.41 
4 22.45 19.50 
Total 23.93 22.14 
84 2 21.94 24.31 17.21 21.56 24.31 15.83 
3 24.71 27.63 18.88 21.67 24.57 16.14 
4 22.03 24.15 17.79 17.16 18.41 14.95 
Total 22.89 25.36 17.96 20.23 22.61 15.64 
(NotBlue) (Blue) (NotBlue) (Blue) 
S8 2 18.72 11.40 33.35 15.96 10.44 29.44 
3 20.90 18.63 25.45 15.94 15.25 17.60 
4 16.08 10.95 26.35 11.02 6.72 20.69 
Total 18.57 13.66 28.38 14.33 10.79 22.68 
(Blue) (NotBlue) (Blue) (NotBlue) 
S4 2 31.23 34.70 24.30 28.89 33.11 19.94 
3 26.73 32.40 15.40 22.80 28.88 11.67 
4 25.27 30.18 15.45 22.13 28.65 7.06 
  Total 27.74 32.43 18.38   24.63 30.24 12.98 
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Table 5 ― Regressions on Psychological Value 
 
    Regression 5   Regression 6 
  mean M     mean Mb   
    β t p   β t p 
GroupOf8 -2.233 -1.150 0.258 -3.152 -1.290 0.207 
Majority 7.781 4.110 0.000 8.808 3.500 0.002 
Minority 2.817 0.770 0.447 -0.237 -0.060 0.954 
NotBlue -13.884 -4.410 0.000 -16.308 -4.510 0.000 
Gender 3.223 1.710 0.098 3.138 1.580 0.125 
EcMgt -3.988 -1.620 0.115 -3.410 -1.270 0.215 
UK 1.249 0.630 0.535 2.260 1.160 0.254 
China -3.925 -1.410 0.168 -5.011 -1.520 0.138 
Age 0.323 1.820 0.079 0.161 0.860 0.395 
Constant 13.842 2.420 0.022 15.828 2.850 0.008 
    Regression 7   Regression 8 
  mean M     mean Mb   
 β  t p β t p 
GroupOf8 -3.291 -1.630 0.116 -4.392 -2.180 0.039 
Majority 7.499 3.520 0.002 8.856 3.240 0.004 
Minority 1.680 0.500 0.624 -1.264 -0.340 0.733 
NotBlue -13.487 -4.560 0.000 -15.970 -4.470 0.000 
Gender 3.846 1.760 0.091 3.969 1.790 0.087 
EcMgt -4.318 -1.570 0.128 -4.102 -1.380 0.180 
UK 1.383 0.570 0.575 2.010 0.790 0.438 
China -5.939 -2.310 0.030 -7.258 -2.140 0.043 
Age 0.233 0.970 0.342 0.106 0.430 0.669 
Risk Aversion -1.368 -0.710 0.485 -0.484 -0.260 0.793 
Loss Aversion 1.381 0.620 0.543 0.464 0.220 0.829 
Ambiguity Aversion 2.110 0.900 0.376 0.805 0.360 0.719 
Conformism 0.170 0.340 0.740 0.094 0.160 0.873 
Constant 21.490 2.730 0.012 20.405 2.830 0.009 
 
Notes: n = 358, R2 = 0.113 for Regression 5, n = 353, R2 = 0.126 for Regression 6, n = 294, 
R2 = 0.159 for Regression 7 and n = 289, R2 = 0.159 for Regression 8. We employ error 
clustering to control for session level effects. 
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Table 6 ― Regressions on DGiving and DReturn Rate 
 
Regressions on Regression 9   Regression 10 
DGiving Rate β t p   β t p 
GroupOf8 -0.066 -1.220 0.231 -0.060 -1.130 0.267 
Majority 0.053 1.030 0.311 0.033 0.670 0.509 
Minority -0.038 -0.960 0.347 -0.046 -1.210 0.237 
NotBlue -0.077 -2.560 0.016 -0.042 -1.330 0.195 
M 0.003 3.580 0.001 
Gender -0.040 -1.370 0.182 -0.049 -1.670 0.107 
EcMgt 0.028 0.930 0.361 0.038 1.280 0.212 
UK 0.028 0.870 0.392 0.025 0.800 0.429 
China 0.035 0.910 0.368 0.045 1.090 0.284 
Age -0.002 -1.170 0.253 -0.003 -1.540 0.135 
Constant 0.192 2.560 0.016 0.156 2.070 0.047 
    Regression 11   Regression 12 
GroupOf8 -0.081 -1.100 0.281 -0.028 -0.470 0.645 
Majority 0.034 0.430 0.673 0.044 0.760 0.454 
Minority -0.056 -1.070 0.293 -0.005 -0.110 0.912 
NotBlue -0.015 -0.260 0.793 -0.079 -2.410 0.024 
M 0.002 2.530 0.017 
M × GroupOf8 0.001 0.470 0.639 
M × Majority 0.000 -0.120 0.903 
M × Minority 0.000 0.330 0.746 
M × NotBlue -0.001 -0.730 0.474 
Gender -0.048 -1.620 0.116 -0.033 -0.940 0.356 
EcMgt 0.039 1.310 0.200 0.004 0.120 0.904 
UK 0.027 0.930 0.360 0.025 0.670 0.509 
China 0.045 1.080 0.289 0.041 0.920 0.366 
Age -0.003 -1.430 0.164 -0.002 -0.630 0.532 
Risk Aversion -0.001 -0.040 0.970 
Loss Aversion 0.005 0.110 0.910 
Ambiguity Aversion 0.007 0.160 0.875 
Conformism -0.003 -0.770 0.450 
Constant 0.158 2.110 0.044 0.155 1.560 0.131 
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Regressions on Regression 13   Regression 14 
DGiving Rate β t p   β t p 
GroupOf8 -0.019 -0.310 0.757 -0.037 -0.460 0.651 
Majority 0.022 0.400 0.694 0.056 0.650 0.523 
Minority -0.010 -0.250 0.808 0.009 0.150 0.879 
NotBlue -0.040 -1.180 0.249 -0.021 -0.360 0.720 
M 0.003 3.660 0.001 0.003 2.650 0.014 
M × GroupOf8 0.001 0.470 0.642 
M × Majority -0.002 -0.640 0.526 
M × Minority -0.001 -0.370 0.718 
M × NotBlue -0.001 -0.640 0.531 
Gender -0.044 -1.250 0.222 0.004 0.130 0.898 
EcMgt 0.016 0.540 0.592 -0.001 -0.030 0.973 
UK 0.021 0.590 0.563 0.001 0.030 0.974 
China 0.058 1.200 0.241 -0.004 -0.940 0.358 
Age -0.002 -0.850 0.405 -0.044 -1.210 0.239 
Risk Aversion 0.003 0.080 0.941 0.020 0.650 0.520 
Loss Aversion 0.001 0.020 0.987 0.026 0.750 0.461 
Ambiguity Aversion 0.000 0.010 0.990 -0.055 -1.120 0.275 
Conformism -0.004 -0.830 0.416 -0.002 -0.670 0.510 
Constant 0.092 0.970 0.340 0.066 0.730 0.472 
Regression on  Regression 15   Regression 16 
DReturn Rate β t p β t p 
DGiving rate as 2nd mover 0.085 1.890 0.068 0.086 1.830 0.077 
GroupOf8 -0.030 -0.820 0.418 -0.037 -1.020 0.314 
Majority -0.031 -0.840 0.405 -0.011 -0.290 0.772 
Minority -0.046 -1.210 0.238 -0.040 -1.150 0.261 
NotBlue -0.006 -0.130 0.897 -0.040 -0.890 0.383 
M -0.002 -3.240 0.003 
Gender 0.004 0.120 0.904 0.011 0.380 0.710 
EcMgt -0.010 -0.260 0.794 -0.019 -0.500 0.618 
UK 0.064 2.750 0.010 0.068 2.830 0.008 
China 0.046 1.090 0.283 0.037 0.900 0.378 
Age 0.002 0.990 0.329 0.003 1.390 0.174 
Constant 0.061 0.830 0.416 0.094 1.290 0.206 
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Regressions on Regression 17   Regression 18 
DReturnRate β t p   β t p 
DGiving rate as 2nd mover 0.080 1.800 0.083 0.069 1.340 0.193 
GroupOf8 -0.034 -0.430 0.669 -0.004 -0.090 0.930 
Majority -0.073 -0.800 0.431 -0.034 -0.860 0.399 
Minority -0.126 -2.090 0.046 -0.023 -0.450 0.655 
NotBlue 0.082 1.060 0.297 -0.012 -0.250 0.805 
M -0.003 -2.250 0.032 
M × GroupOf8 0.000 -0.050 0.959 
M × Majority 0.002 0.740 0.462 
M × Minority 0.004 1.440 0.162 
M × NotBlue -0.006 -2.310 0.028 
Gender 0.017 0.620 0.540 -0.020 -0.560 0.579 
EcMgt -0.026 -0.680 0.504 -0.029 -0.660 0.517 
UK 0.067 2.620 0.014 0.041 1.470 0.154 
China 0.031 0.710 0.486 0.085 1.840 0.078 
Age 0.003 1.400 0.172 0.001 0.340 0.734 
Risk Aversion -0.056 -2.110 0.046 
Loss Aversion 0.059 2.050 0.052 
Ambiguity Aversion 0.054 1.820 0.081 
Conformism -0.004 -0.650 0.523 
Constant 0.100 1.250 0.222 0.083 0.910 0.370 
    Regression 19   Regression 20 
DGiving rate as 2nd mover 0.065 1.200 0.241 0.061 1.190 0.244 
GroupOf8 -0.014 -0.280 0.780 -0.082 -0.790 0.436 
Majority -0.013 -0.310 0.761 -0.097 -0.910 0.372 
Minority -0.018 -0.390 0.702 -0.184 -2.440 0.023 
NotBlue -0.049 -1.020 0.317 0.079 0.970 0.341 
M -0.003 -3.080 0.005 -0.006 -3.940 0.001 
M × GroupOf8 0.003 0.730 0.474 
M × Majority 0.003 0.840 0.409 
M × Minority 0.007 2.470 0.021 
M × NotBlue -0.006 -2.100 0.047 
Gender -0.011 -0.310 0.761 -0.056 -2.030 0.053 
EcMgt -0.041 -0.900 0.378 0.059 2.000 0.057 
UK 0.045 1.560 0.131 -0.057 -1.850 0.076 
China 0.070 1.500 0.147 -0.003 -0.380 0.709 
Age 0.001 0.650 0.524 -0.002 -0.060 0.955 
Risk Aversion -0.059 -2.360 0.027 -0.048 -1.090 0.285 
Loss Aversion 0.062 2.280 0.032 0.041 1.320 0.201 
Ambiguity Aversion 0.060 2.090 0.048 -0.063 -1.180 0.251 
Conformism -0.004 -0.530 0.599 0.001 0.440 0.667 
Constant 0.140 1.670 0.107 0.233 2.610 0.015 
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Notes: n = 358, R2 = 0.037 for Regression 9, n = 358, R2 = 0.069 for Regression 10, n = 358, 
R2 = 0.070 for Regression 11 and n = 294, R2 = 0.026 for Regression 12; n = 294, R2 = 0.066 
for Regression 13, n = 294, R2 = 0.070 for Regression 14, n = 355, R2 = 0.034 for Regression 
15 and n = 355, R2 = 0.060 for Regression 16; n = 355, R2 = 0.080 for Regression 17, n = 
292, R2 = 0.039 for Regression 18, n = 292, R2 = 0.066 for Regression 19 and n = 292, R2 = 
0.094 for Regression 20. We employ error clustering to control for session level effects. 
